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ABSTRACT 
The idea that justified modal belief can be accounted for in terms of 
empirically justified, non-modal belief is enjoying increasing 
popularity in the epistemology of modality. One alleged reason to 
prefer modal empiricism over more traditional, rationalist modal 
epistemologies is that empiricism avoids the problem with the 
integration challenge that arise for rationalism, assuming that we want 
to be realists about modal metaphysics. In this paper, I argue that 
given two very reasonable constraints on what it means to meet the 
integration challenge for modality, empiricism is currently at best on a 
par with, but potentially worse off than, rationalist alternatives, with 
respect to the integration challenge.  
 
1. Introduction 
The epistemology of modality is concerned with elucidating what is required for justified 
modal belief.1 Modal epistemologies of a traditional cut tend to be rationalist in nature. That 
is, they take the justification of modal beliefs to be had by fundamentally a priori means. 
Among rationalist modal epistemologies, we find Bealer’s modal intuitionism (2002); the 
conceivability theories of Yablo (1993), Menzies (1998), and Chalmers (2002); the essence-
based modal epistemologies of Lowe (2012) and Hale (2013); and the account based on 
grasping “principles of possibility” due to Peacocke (1999). But rationalist modal 
 
1 In what follows I will take it that not much of interest to the central issues of modal epistemology hinges on the 
difference between modal knowledge and justified modal belief – the relevant action is arguably with the justification-
part. I will thus alternate between speaking of ‘modal knowledge’ and ‘modal justification’. 
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epistemologies have, perhaps always but in particular during recent years, been subject to 
extensive criticism.2 At the same time, the star of empiricist modal epistemologies has been 
steadily on the rise. According to modal empiricism, experience or experiential non-modal 
knowledge justifies modal beliefs. Put slightly differently, the idea is that experience is able to 
provide evidence of modal truth. This includes modal epistemologies according to which we 
can e.g. perceive a non-actual possibility directly, as Strohminger (2015) has suggested, but 
more common is what Fischer (2017), following McGinn (1999), calls “liberalised 
empiricism”.3 According to liberalised modal empiricism, modal beliefs are not directly 
justified via experience. Rather it is non-modal, experientially justified beliefs together with 
some ampliative principle of reasoning, that justifies a modal belief. The ampliative principle 
of reasoning in question might be e.g. inductive, abductive, analogical, or (although not 
strictly speaking “ampliative”) deductive. In this paper, I focus on liberalised modal 
empiricism (and that is what I will intend with ‘empiricism’ in what follows). Some examples 
of empiricist theories in this sense are Biggs’ (2011) abduction-based account, Elder’s (2004, 
chapter 2) epistemology of essences based on the method of “flanking properties”, Roca-
Royes’ (2017) similarity-based epistemology of de re possibilities for concrete objects, and 
Leon’s (2017) “Moorean” approach which features a mixed bag of ordinary inference-
patterns (e.g. induction, analogy) applied to uncontroversial knowledge of the actual world.4 
Much (although not all) of the criticism of modal rationalism can be traced back to an 
alleged inability to deal with what is known as the integration challenge (Peacocke, 1999) for 
modality. The integration challenge is the challenge to, in Peacocke’s words, “reconcile a 
plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible 
account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them” (1999, p. 1). That is 
to say, from the perspective of modal epistemology, the metaphysics of modality one assumes 
to be correct must mesh with the epistemology of modality one is putting forward (I offer my 
view on what this involves in the next section). In particular, it has often been suggested that 
if we want to be modal realists – i.e. if we assume a metaphysics of modality that takes modal 
 
2 See e.g. Horvath (2014), Kung (2010), Leech (2011), Roca-Royes (2010, 2011a), Williamson (2007), Worley (2003). 
3 Not all modal epistemologies admit of being classified as “rationalist” or “empiricist”. Moreover, while the use of 
these labels is widespread in the field, not everyone finds it very useful, see e.g. Williamson (2007) and Jenkins (2010), 
for instance because they think experience play an important yet non-evidential role in modal knowledge. Here 
however, I am concerned here with the integrative potential of accounts properly classified as empiricist, whether or 
not there are other ways for experience to play a role in modal epistemology. 
4 Also relevant is Vetter (2016). She defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality based on gradual extrapolation 
from knowledge of everyday ‘can’-statements (e.g. I can reach the mug; That horse can jump a 1m fence). She does 
not give her own account of how we know ‘can’-statements but points to the work of e.g. Strohminger and Roca-
Royes, so presumably it is supposed to be empirically grounded.  
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facts to be relevantly mind-independent – it is difficult to meet the integration challenge for 
modality as long as we are also modal rationalists. In contrast, this charge has not been 
directed at modal empiricism, even though its proponents tend to subscribe to modal realism. 
There are two possible reasons for this. Either empiricists do not need to meet the integration 
challenge, or modal empiricism does not present an obstacle to meeting the integration 
challenge, even assuming modal realism. As I will argue below, the former is implausible 
since friends of modal empiricism extensively and repeatedly criticise rationalist modal 
epistemologies for not being able to meet the integration challenge, and so presumably they 
take the integration challenge to be important. Thus, it better be the case that modal 
empiricism does not face similar difficulties.  
I argue in this paper that empiricists have not done enough to show that this is the case. 
In particular, two – by the empiricists’ own lights – reasonable constraints on what it means to 
meet the integration challenge, gives us reason to doubt that liberalised modal empiricists are 
sufficiently out of the woods, as far as the integration challenge is concerned, to be in a 
position to criticise modal rationalists for failing to meet the very same challenge. The plan is 
as follows. In section 2 I introduce the integration challenge as the challenge to explain why 
some particular method is a reliable means for getting at modal truth, given the nature of 
modal truth. In section 3 I propose two constraints on attempts to provide such an 
explanation: METAPHYSICS MATTERS and NO MERE DEFERRAL. I continue in section 4 by 
elucidating what I take to be the way in which liberalised modal empiricism is supposed to 
meet the integration challenge, namely by way of deferring the challenge to a domain of non-
modal facts. I argue that this strategy fails to heed the NO MERE DEFERRAL constraint, because 
the reliability of the ampliative principle(s) remains unexplained. In section 5 I argue that 
modal empiricists also fail to heed METAPHYSICS MATTERS. Until this is amended – and 
amendment requires elaboration of what the relevant version of modal realism is taken to be – 
modal empiricism is worse off than some of its main rationalist adversaries. 
 
2. The integration challenge for modality 
The integration challenge (IC) for an area – e.g. modality, mathematics, or morality – is the 
challenge to reconcile the epistemology and metaphysics of that area. The challenge applies to 
all areas where sentences are truth-apt and we want to reject scepticism. Of course, it is not 
equally challenging to account for integration in all areas, but modality is an area where it is 
often assumed to be difficult. Note though, that accounting for integration for modality does 
not have to be challenging. Whether it is challenging to reconcile the epistemology and 
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metaphysics of an area depends on the theories that are taken to outline the correct nature of, 
and epistemic route to, modal truth. Philosophers disagree on these things, but we might say 
that there is an integration challenge for an area where the dominant views on the 
metaphysics and epistemology of that area are in tension. That said, there may be other 
available accounts of that area where integration is comparatively easily achieved (although 
these may be considered unattractive for other reasons). 
Modal epistemology is concerned with the justification of modal beliefs. I assume here 
that whatever else is required for a method to be able to confer epistemic justification on a 
belief, it involves indicating the truth of that belief. From the perspective of modal 
epistemology then, IC is the task of explaining why –  in virtue of what – the method 
suggested by one’s theory is truth-indicative, given the modal metaphysics that is taken to 
underwrite these truths. It is challenging in particular when modal realism is assumed on the 
metaphysics-side of things. There are several different ways in which one can understand this 
explanatory challenge and what it requires. In what follows, I detail how I understand it. 
First, I assume that in order for the IC for modality to be met, it is not enough that the 
epistemological thesis and the metaphysical thesis proposed are compatible in the weak sense 
of not precluding the possibility of modal knowledge/justification when both are taken to be 
true. Rather, the challenge is to provide some explanation, some account that elucidates how 
it can be that this or that method for supporting modal beliefs is somehow conducive to modal 
truth, given what we take modal truth to amount to. In short, we must see how the positive 
story is supposed to play out.5 
Second, I wish to distinguish between showing that some allegedly justificatory method 
is truth-conducive in modal matters, and explaining why this is the case (assuming that it is). 
In this I am following work on the IC for mathematics, in particular due to Field (1989), 
which is a very common inspiration for discussion about integration in other areas. Field 
poses a challenge to platonists about numbers: explain the reliability of our allegedly 
justificatory methods in mathematics, assuming that mathematical truths are about platonic 
objects.6 Field suggests that this is impossible; we cannot square epistemology and 
 
5 This more demanding construal is in the interest of modal empiricists given that they want to criticise modal 
rationalists for not meeting the IC – see section 3 below. For a more elaborate discussion, see my (2019a, chapter 2) 
and Roca-Royes (forthcoming, section 5.2).  
6 Field, in turn, is elaborating on the problem posed by Benacerraf (1973). For similar reasoning in the case of moral 
realism, see Mackie (1977). Exactly what Field’s challenge is supposed to be is a matter of controversy – what I offer 
here is my interpretation, cf. also footnote 10 below. Note however, that given my assumption in this paper that modal 
justification at least requires a reliable connection with modal truth, explaining modal justification involves (but need 
not be exhausted by) explaining the relevant method’s reliability. 
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metaphysics of mathematics if we insist on being platonists. Notably though, Field allows the 
platonist to assume the actual truth and reliability of mathematical beliefs (see also e.g. 
Clarke-Doane, 2017, p. 21; Linnebo, 2006, pp. 551-552) so the question is never whether we 
have reliably true mathematical beliefs, but with explaining how that can be, holding fixed 
some epistemology and some metaphysics of mathematics. Now, if it is possible to give an 
explanation of why an allegedly justificatory method is indicative of modal truth, under the 
assumption that it is, that can certainly be a reason (although probably not a conclusive one) 
to think it is a reliable guide to modal truth. But it is not the case that any reason to think that 
an allegedly justificatory method is reliable is also an explanation of why it is reliable.  
An analogy might help to illustrate this. It is often assumed that simplicity, or 
parsimony, is a virtue of theories in science (and philosophy), because simple theories are 
more likely to be true, all else equal. Why should we accept this? There are a number of 
attempts to defend this assumption as far as science is concerned. One of them merely appeals 
to the demonstrably good track-record of simple theories over less simple theories – they 
deliver excellent predictive power, cool technology, and so on. This gives us reason to think 
that simplicity is truth-conducive. Other attempts instead aim at explaining why parsimonious 
theories are more likely to be true. Huemer (2009) points out:  
It is worth noting, however, that the [track record argument], whether persuasive 
or not, makes no attempt to explain why simplicity is truth-indicative. Thus, even 
if it persuades sceptics of the value of simplicity, we would still need the [other] 
sort of explanatory theories (…) (pp. 218-219).  
I take the IC to be related to the why-question, to giving an explanation, rather than to the 
whether-question.  
Similarly, just as I take the IC to be distinct from the challenge to show that a method 
actually delivers true beliefs in this world, I take it to be distinct from what we may call the 
“modal challenge”: the challenge to secure modal co-variance between beliefs and facts of an 
area (for authors who emphasise this latter task as the relevant one, see e.g. Baras, 2017; 
Clarke-Doane, 2017; forthcoming, chapters 4 and 5; Pust, 2004). Demonstrating that some 
method or other is reliable with respect to modal truth does not automatically amount to 
meeting the IC for modality. One reason for distinguishing between meeting the IC and 
meeting the modal challenge is that the latter can be done without taking the nature of modal 
facts into account (see so-called minimalist solutions), whereas the former cannot (more on 
this in the next section). Relatedly – and this is also what enables minimalist solutions – when 
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necessary truths are involved (as they clearly are here), understanding explanation of 
reliability in purely modal terms has odd results to say the least.7 
In relation to this, it is important to address the question of why we should care about 
meeting the IC, since what counts as a relevant and satisfactory explanation in a given context 
plausibly depends partly on e.g. interest and purpose. Clarke-Doane, who emphasise the 
modal challenge (and the sufficiency of minimalist solutions), suggest that there is no other 
epistemically important sense of ‘explain the reliability’ besides that of securing modal co-
variation. This claim must be understood against the background of his assumption that 
failure to explain the reliability of e.g. modal beliefs based on some method m, is supposed to 
provide us with an undercutting defeater for those beliefs.8 That is, it is important to be able to 
“explain the reliability” of m because if we cannot, our actual, first-order beliefs based on m 
turn out unjustified. And since meeting the modal challenge (but not the IC) suffices to deflect 
the threat from the undercutting defeater, that should be satisfactory (2017, p. 30; 32). 
On my view, in contrast, a modal epistemology should explain the reliability of method 
m allegedly capable of justifying modal beliefs, because doing so is an important part of 
supporting and elucidating that particular theory which centrally claims that m is a route to 
justified modal belief. Assuming that true belief is the aim of modal inquiry, to put forward m 
as able to confer justification – i.e. to give a modal epistemology – is to claim that m connects 
modal beliefs to modal truth. Whether or not something is a modal truth depends on some 
fact(s). A modal metaphysics spells out the nature of those facts. So it is reasonable to expect 
an account of how this connection runs. 
The IC is about explaining why m (as specified by a modal epistemology) is reliable 
given some account of the truths (i.e. some modal metaphysics) it is reliable with respect to. 
The relevant sense of ‘explain’ here is to elucidate what is going on “under the hood”, so to 
speak, of the central claim of the modal epistemology in question, i.e. that m connects our 
modal beliefs with modal truths. It is to say in virtue of what that connection holds; to 
“describe the mechanism that realizes this reliability” (Grundmann, 2007, p. 83); to “explain 
what makes it the case that the process is reliable” (Linnebo, 2006, p. 563).9 If it appears 
impossible to meet the IC given some account(s) of modal justification and/or modality, this 
 
7 See e.g. Baras (2017); Clarke-Doane (2015, 2017); Enoch (2010); Grundmann (2007); Pust (2004) both for minimalist 
solutions and for good presentations of what happens when we understand ‘explain the reliability’ in modal terms 
when the relevant truths are necessary (which is the case even with metaphysical possibility-claims, assuming S5). 
8 An undercutting defeater for the belief that p is a reason to doubt that one’s original evidence for p is sufficiently 
indicative of p. This is different from a rebutting defeater for the belief that p, which is evidence for not-p. 
9 My emphasis in both cases. 
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reflects badly on that theory. This is distinct from reflecting badly on people’s actual, first-
order modal beliefs (which is what e.g. Clarke-Doane takes to be the primary worry). The 
problem I focus on is that the theory of modal justification, on which the IC cannot be met, 
fails to discharge a particular explanatory burden, and this gives us a reason to reject that 
theory and suspect it does not give the right account of justified modal belief.10, 11 
 
3. Two constraints 
First, in order to evaluate how well a particular modal epistemology performs with the IC, we 
must have some idea of what the correct modal metaphysics is taken to be. The claim that 
one’s preferred modal epistemology can meet the IC is only meaningful in relation to some 
modal metaphysics or other, i.e. we must evaluate theories in pairs. A particular epistemology 
may go very well with one metaphysics, but not with another. Thus, there is no “metaphysics-
neutral” way to meet the IC. Let’s call this constraint on a solution to the IC METAPHYSICS 
MATTERS.  
I take this constraint to be pretty natural – after all, it is hard to reconcile epistemology 
and metaphysics without having some particular metaphysics in mind. Moreover, as I noted 
above, the reason integration is challenging in an area has a lot to do with the kind of modal 
metaphysics one is willing to consider. In particular, the IC for modality is challenging 
assuming modal realism. During the last half of the 20th century, the dominating modal 
metaphysics took modal truths to hold in virtue of possible worlds. These were conceived of 
in different ways. David Lewis (1986) famously takes modal truths to hold in virtue of 
goings-on in causally closed off, concrete worlds just like our own, whereas Ersatzers like 
Stalnaker (1976) and Plantinga (1978) take possible worlds to be abstract entities that form 
part of the actual world. The IC for modality seems initially difficult on all of these views, in 
the sense that it seems unclear how we could explain any assumed epistemological success on 
our part with respect to facts with such natures (concrete yet causally closed off, and abstract 
yet mind-independent, respectively). If we were instead attracted to e.g. Blackburn’s (1993) 
 
10 I said above that I take Field’s challenge to be an instance of IC for mathematics. Baras, Clarke-Doane, and Pust all 
take Field’s challenge to be the modal challenge, which I just said we should distinguish from IC. In fact, it is not at all 
clear from Field’s original formulation (1989, pp. 25-30; 230-233) just what he thinks it takes to “explain reliability”, 
and why it is important to do so (cf. Sjölin Wirling, 2019b). Thus, the challenge is surely open to both interpretations. 
For an interpretation of Field in line with mine, see David Liggins (2006, 2010, 2018). 
11 Whether it also creates an undercutting defeater for modal beliefs based on the method specified by the relevant 
epistemology, depends on one’s view on defeaters, and I do not take a stand on that here. There are some interesting 
parallels here to the debate about evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics, see e.g. Clarke-Doane (2015), 
Vavova (2015), Tersman (2017), and Korman and Locke (forthcoming) for relevant discussion. 
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view of modal facts as constitutively dependent on our abilities to imagine, achieving 
integration appears less challenging.  
Given that the IC is the task to explain why a particular method is a guide to modal 
truth, when modal truths hold in virtue of facts with such-and-such a nature, it is presumably 
not enough to assume “modal realism” in general, on the metaphysics side, because not all 
realist modal metaphysics present the same kinds of problems (and some features may be 
problematic only in relations to some candidate epistemologies). In order to evaluate whether 
the IC can be met assuming such-and-such a modal epistemology, we must have a more 
specific idea of the nature of modal facts, beyond their mind-independence: are they acausal 
or causal; abstract or concrete; how do they relate to other facts; and so on. This does not 
mean that a modal epistemology cannot be “neutral” in the sense that it could potentially 
integrate well with several accounts of modal metaphysics that cannot simultaneously be 
correct. It just means that in order to evaluate whether some modal epistemology can meet the 
IC, we must hold fixed, for the sake of argument, some particular metaphysics of modality.12 
(Of course, it takes two to tango, and so the details of the epistemology proposed also matter 
– but modal epistemologists hardly need to be reminded about that.) In a similar vein, 
Mallozzi (2018) stresses that modal metaphysics is important to modal epistemology, because 
our modalising must be constrained by something tracking the metaphysical grounds for 
modal truth in order to be reliable. Accounting for in virtue of what this tracking holds is 
exactly what meeting the IC amounts to, on my view, and that requires an account of what 
these grounds are. Mallozzi recommends modal epistemologists to proceed in a “metaphysics-
first” manner, but I am here content to say that integration can only be assessed in relation to 
some particular modal metaphysics, and so at some point the metaphysics has to be done. 
Next, the IC for modality cannot simply be deferred to another domain. Or rather, if a 
modal epistemology proceeds by deferring the challenge to another domain, then it must be 
the case that the IC for that other domain is, in turn, met. Let’s call this the NO MERE 
DEFERRAL constraint on attempts to meet the IC. Deferral is common in modal epistemology. 
The basic idea is simple: construe modal knowledge as being somehow downstream from 
some kind of non-modal knowledge k. Either modal beliefs are inferred from k, or they 
essentially depend on k in some other way. Deferral strategies are employed by both 
rationalists and empiricists. For instance, modal epistemologies that account for modal 
 
12 Roca-Royes (forthcoming) also emphasises this. 
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knowledge in terms of knowledge of essentialist truths use the deferral strategy13, as do 
liberalised modal empiricists. They differ in what they take to be the relevant k. Part of the 
point with deferral arguably derives from concerns with the IC: the hope is that it is easier to 
meet the IC for k in relation to the relevant facts, than for modal beliefs in relation to modal 
facts. Thus, for the deferral move to be well-motivated, it is important that this is indeed the 
case. 
Modal empiricist Roca-Royes’ (2010) criticism of Peacocke’s (1999) rationalist modal 
epistemology is instructive in seeing what NO MERE DEFERRAL dictates. She argues that 
although Peacocke’s modal epistemology is specifically designed to meet the IC, all it 
manages to do is push the problem sideways. The key to Peacocke’s attempt to achieve 
integration is something called “principles of possibility”. Peacocke’s preferred modal 
metaphysics is a linguistic ersatz-view, according to which a claim like <◇This table breaks> 
is true in virtue of some possible world, construed as a set of propositions, and which possible 
worlds there are is determined by the principles of possibility (see e.g. his 1999, section 4.2). 
According to the modal epistemology proposed, Ethan is justified in his modal belief that it is 
possible that this table breaks, if he arrived at that belief through investigating a priori 
whether the concept ‘POSSIBLE’ applies to the proposition <This table breaks>. Thus, in order 
to have modal knowledge one must possess the concept ‘POSSIBLE’. The principles of 
possibility form the possession-conditions of this concept in the sense that unless you have 
implicit knowledge of the principles, you do not possess the right concept ‘POSSIBLE’. That is, 
if you possess the concept ‘POSSIBLE’ you have access to the set of possible worlds, because 
possessing the right concept involves grasping the principles of possibility, and they also 
determine what possible worlds there are. Now, Roca-Royes argues that possessing the right 
concept ‘POSSIBLE’ amounts to grasping certain constitutive truths, but how we might come 
by this understanding remains unelucidated by Peacocke. Since modal knowledge is 
explained in terms of grasping constitutive truths, the IC for modality has been deferred to the 
domain of constitutive truths. The problem is that the IC for that domain has not been met, 
and so there is no solution on which we might piggy-back in order to meet the IC for 
modality. Roca-Royes calls this the “revenge of the integration challenge” (2010, p. 340).14 
 
13 At least insofar as the currently popular view in line with Fine (1994), according to which essence-claims are not 
themselves modal although they have modal implications, is assumed.  
14 Roca-Royes elsewhere criticises other modal epistemologies for also (implicitly) relying on unelucidated essentialist 
knowledge, see (2011a, 2011b). See also Tahko (2012) for an argument to the effect that Williamson’s counterfactual-
based modal epistemology does so, and Vaidya and Wallner (2018) raises a version of this problem for a number of 
prominent modal epistemologies.  
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More generally then, while there is nothing wrong in principle with a deferral strategy, it can 
only be considered successful if the IC for the deferred-to domain is indeed met.  
With the notion of a deferral strategy on the table, another way in which METAPHYSICS 
MATTERS is important emerges. A modal epistemology that employs a deferral strategy 
encourages us to switch our attention from the modal beliefs themselves to some different 
class of, (allegedly) epistemically more basic, non-modal beliefs, and consider the method 
which supports them. Insofar as we care about integration, i.e. about explaining the reliability 
of the method in question, we also switch our attention from the modal facts to a different sort 
of facts, namely the facts that these non-modal beliefs are about. In order to comply with NO 
MERE DEFERRAL, it is important that the reliability of the non-modal method is explainable in 
relation to the non-modal facts, i.e. that the IC is met for the new domain. But reasonably, the 
IC for modality will also involve explaining why modal beliefs, based on beliefs reliable with 
respect to certain non-modal facts, should correspond to modal truths. This presumably 
requires something of the modal facts. In particular, the move from non-modal to modal belief 
needs to correspond to some connection between the relevant non-modal facts and modal 
facts. An example will be helpful here. E. J. Lowe (2012) puts forward a modal epistemology 
which tries to account for our knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of essentialist 
knowledge. This modal epistemology thus employs a deferral strategy. Lowe summarises his 
account as follows: 
 [I]t is part of our essence as rational, thinking beings that we can at least 
sometimes understand a real definition – which is just a special kind of 
proposition [namely those that express the essence of a thing] – and thereby grasp 
the essences of at least some things. Hence, we can know at least sometimes that 
something is metaphysically necessary or possible: we can have some knowledge 
of metaphysical modality (2012, p. 947).  
In order for the IC to be met given this theory, what is required? Well, it must be elucidated 
how one can draw modal conclusions about what is possible and necessary, on the basis of 
essentialist knowledge. And in order to comply with NO MERE DEFERRAL it must seem 
plausible that the IC can be met for essentialist beliefs had by the method Lowe envisages, 
given the nature Lowe takes essentialist facts to have – the metaphysics of essence-facts 
clearly matters for that. But metaphysics also matters in another way: we need to know what 
essentialist facts have to do with modal facts, since this seems crucial for the idea that 
essentialist knowledge can justify modal beliefs. To compare, consider drawing conclusions 
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about some unobservable entities on the basis of empirically justified beliefs about observable 
facts and entities – this only makes sense if we have postulated some sort of real relation 
between observables and unobservables. The idea here is similar.  
In general, the task of connecting the relevant non-modal facts to the modal facts is a 
way in which METAPHYSICS MATTERS appears for deferral strategies, since elucidating this 
connection between two kinds of fact presumably involves some assumption about the nature 
of those kinds of facts. Lowe does account of the connection – his metaphysics of modality in 
terms of essences is a centrepiece of the view. This essentialist account of the modality 
certainly bears further discussion, but at least there is such an account. Similarly, on 
Peacocke’s view outlined briefly above, the relationship between the grounds for the modal 
truths and the constitutive truths is quite clear. 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS and NO MERE DEFERRAL are reasonable constraints on a modal 
epistemology that aspires to meet the IC. The former should be obvious to anyone who 
accepts that the IC is the challenge to reconcile epistemology with metaphysics (what else 
could it be?), and accepts the idea that this reconciliation involves being able to give an 
explanation. The latter assumption is friendly to modal empiricists, since – as will become 
evident in the next section – they often criticise rationalists for failing to meet the IC. If the IC 
were just about not precluding modal knowledge, it seems rationalists would have no 
particular problem. For instance, there is nothing in the conjunction of Lewisian concretism 
about possible worlds, and, say, some imagination-based epistemology, that preclude modal 
knowledge. But the problem is that things are left unexplained. Similarly, NO MERE DEFERRAL 
also forms the basis for some important criticism against several rationalist modal 
epistemologies employing deferral strategies, including Peacocke’s account, as we just saw. 
In the next two sections, I will argue that current versions of liberalised modal 
empiricism fail to heed both constraints. I first argue that liberalised modal empiricism falls 
prey to a revenge of the IC, in the sense of not complying with NO MERE DEFERRAL. Then I go 
on to highlight how it also fails METAPHYSICS MATTERS, as it appears for deferral strategies. 
 
4. Integrative promise and integrative problems 
Modal empiricists do not say very much about how the IC for modality is met on their 
account. Yet, they often press the objection against their rationalist competitors that the latter 
fail to meet the IC. For instance, it is a standard critique of conceivability theory, according to 
which the fact that I can conceive of a world which verifies p is a justifier for my belief that p 
is possible, that it fails to answer what Vaidya (2015) calls the Connection Question: how is 
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conceivability connected to possibility? In this vein, Kung (2010) questions the justificatory 
power of the imagination with respect to modal matters, on the basis of the claim that 
imagination has very few constraints, and the constraints that it does have seem unrelated to 
the utter bounds of modal truth. That is, Kung complains that we cannot see why this method 
would track the modal facts, i.e. imagination-based modal epistemologies have not met the 
IC. I already noted that Roca-Royes (2010) criticises Peacocke’s modal rationalism for 
pushing the problem sideways rather than meeting the IC. Biggs starts off the motivation for 
his abduction-based modal empiricism by presenting the IC as an insurmountable task for 
modal rationalism (2011, pp. 287-289). Vetter (2016) writes that given modal realism, “anti-
exceptionalist” modal epistemologies (to which empiricist accounts arguably belong) are 
much better placed than traditional, rationalist accounts, to show how modal thought manages 
to “hook on to reality”, and see Jenkins (2008) for a very similar passage. And so on. In short, 
the IC is genuinely important to friends of empiricism, so it better be the case that modal 
empiricism can meet it.  
How, then, is that supposed to happen? This is how I take it to work. Liberalised modal 
empiricism employs a deferral strategy. Just as some accounts defer the IC to the domain of 
essentialist truths, liberalised empiricists defer the IC to some (sub)domain of non-modal 
facts, e.g. the domain of facts about actual property instantiation. The integrative promise of 
empiricism, I assume, lies in the fact that this domain, to which the IC is deferred, seems 
relatively unproblematic. If modal justification is somehow downstream from empirically 
justified, non-modal beliefs, we can meet the IC for modality by meeting the IC for perceptual 
non-modal beliefs vis-à-vis the non-modal facts of actual property instantiation that they are 
about, and that we can presumably do in terms of various complex causal relations. It might 
thus seem as if modal empiricism has no problem heeding NO MERE DEFERRAL – rather, the 
deferral appears exceptionally successful, compared to deferral attempts that appeal to 
essentialist knowledge or knowledge of constitutive truths.15 However, modal empiricists 
complement empirically justified non-modal beliefs with ampliative principles, in particular 
inductive and/or abductive principles, which means that as far as integration is concerned, 
they cannot rest easy just yet. I will presently argue that since it is left unexplained why these 
principles lead us to modal truth, liberalised modal empiricism has so far failed to meet the 
IC. 
 
15 Of course, essentialist modal epistemologists might not agree, but I will grant this much to the modal empiricists 
here for the sake of argument. For some recent attempts to provide an epistemology of essence, see Tahko (2018) and 
Mallozzi (2018). 
 13 
It will be useful to have an example to work with here, and I will focus on Roca-Royes 
induction-based modal empiricism.16 She captures her own suggested account in slogan form 
like so:  
We know about some entities’ unrealized possibilities by extrapolation from 
knowledge about some other, similar entities’ realized possibilities (2017, p. 233).  
For instance, Darla’s belief that it is possible for the (currently not-broken) glass screen of her 
phone to break, is justified by her experiential knowledge about other phone screens, 
relevantly similar to the screen of her own phone, that are actually broken. The idea, in a 
nutshell, is that Darla can infer this piece of modal knowledge inductively from pieces of 
empirically acquired non-modal knowledge that she possesses. Let a be the screen of Darla’s 
phone, and let B<◇Cracked(a)> be Darla’s belief that the screen of her phone could possibly 
crack. According to the slogan then, Darla is justified in holding B<◇Cracked(a)> on the 
basis of justified non-modal belief about actuality. First, she believes that a is a glass phone 
screen, i.e. she holds B<GPS(a)>. She believes this on the basis of empirical evidence, e.g. 
she can see it, feel it, hear it if she taps it with her nail, and she has read the product 
specifications on the back of the box the phone came in. Second, she holds beliefs 
B<GPS(b)> and B<GPS(c)>, where b is the screen of her previous phone, and c is the screen 
of her brother’s phone, for similar reasons. Third, she beliefs that both b and c actually 
instantiate the property of being cracked, i.e. she holds B<Cracked(b)> because she saw it 
crack, and B<Cracked(c) because her brother, who dropped it, told her. Let’s grant that these 
are all perfectly fine, empirically justified beliefs, supported by methods for which the IC can 
be met. 
In order to get from these beliefs about actual property instantiation to the modal belief 
B<◇Cracked(a)>, Darla relies on induction. On the basis of her beliefs about b and c (and 
perhaps other similar entities too), she holds a (perhaps tacit) belief in a principle along the 
lines of ∀x(GPS(x) → ◇Cracked(x)). This is what Roca-Royes calls “nomic-like knowledge” 
(2017, pp. 229-230). Together with the belief that <GPS(a)> is true, it clearly follows from 
this principle that it is possible that a cracks (since a is a phone screen and if something is a 
phone screen it can possibly crack, according to the principle). The crucial work for induction 
is to support the relevant nomic belief (which is clearly a modal belief). But in order to get the 
 
16 Her account is arguably the most detailed liberalised empiricist candidate to date. See also Elder (2004) and Leon 
(2017) for other empiricist examples that partly appeal to induction, and see Biggs (2011) for an empiricist account 
which appeals to abduction. 
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right principle from these empirically justified beliefs, using induction, we also need to add 
the belief that actuality implies possibility, in this case that <Cracked(b) → ◇Cracked(b)> 
(which Roca-Royes takes to be a conceptual truth, grasped in whatever way we grasp such 
truths). 
Has the IC been met for this account, assuming modal realism? We have granted that 
the IC is met for perceptually justified beliefs about actual property instantiation. Let’s also 
grant, for the sake of argument, that there is no issue with integration for the principle that 
actuality implies possibility.17 But what about the inductive reasoning doing all the heavy 
lifting here, has its reliability been explained? 18 Differently put, has the IC for induction been 
met?  
To the extent that the matter is discussed by Roca-Royes, she notes that while there is 
certainly an interesting and difficult question concerning what she calls the “epistemic 
adequacy”19 of ampliative methods like induction more generally, there is no special problem 
for an epistemology of modality that also uses induction (2017, pp. 230-232). What does this 
mean? Well, either we do have enough of an explanation of the reliability of induction, or we 
do not. It is certainly an open question. Roca-Royes notes that in principle we can test 
whether induction delivers the right results in the case of de re possibility beliefs (2017, p. 
232). In the example of Darla’s belief, we can attempt to break the phone screen after she has 
formed the belief that it can possibly break, using the method outlined above. We could do 
this over and over with different phone screens, and with different entities that are similar in 
other respects. Given enough data, if the success rate – the ratio of true modal beliefs arrived 
at through the given method – is high enough, we could say that it is a reliable method for 
forming that kind of modal beliefs. This might be terribly cumbersome an experiment in 
practice, but as a test of in-fact reliability, it is perfectly straight-forward. Moreover, isn’t it 
natural and highly intuitive to think, after observing instances of similar entities actually 
instantiating some property, that this entity here could also possibly instantiate that property? 
We take induction as justification-conferring in many contexts, so why shouldn’t it be here 
too?  
 
17 One could raise the question of whether the reliability of our method for coming to know conceptual truths really 
do meet the IC, and insist that the modal empiricist say something about this as well. I won’t pursue that here. 
18 Note though, that the explanatory task here is not the same as the task to independently justify e.g. induction or 
abduction – that would be a tall order indeed – since one is allowed to assume the reliability of the method in explaining 
it. 
19 This way of phrasing it is unfortunately a bit vague, but I will consider this as pertaining to the IC.  
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I have no quarrel with either testability or intuitiveness here. But neither point speaks to 
the issue of integration. Again, the IC is not primarily about giving reasons to think that a 
particular method is a reliable guide to modal truth, but with elucidating why it is supposedly 
reliable (although, again, if the IC can be met that might itself be a reason to think that the 
method in question is indeed reliable). Recall the analogous case of simplicity as a theoretical 
virtue: empirical evidence that simple theories are often true is not an explanation of 
simplicity’s truth-conduciveness. So none of this does anything to indicate what explains the 
reliability of induction. It should be clear that the situation is similar for liberalised modal 
empiricists that rely on another ampliative principle, like abduction, such as Biggs (2011). It 
far from evident that we have enough of an explanation of why abduction is reliable – we 
have less of it than in the case of induction, I suspect.20 
And if we do not have an explanation of induction (or abduction) more generally, it is 
not clear how this fact could be of any consolation to the modal empiricist, since the result is 
still that the IC has not been met: 
P1. In order to meet the IC for modality, NO MERE DEFERRAL and METAPHYSICS MATTERS 
must be respected. 
P2. Liberalised modal empiricism fails to respect NO MERE DEFERRAL (from P2a, P2b). 
P2a. Liberalised modal empiricism defers to perceptual knowledge and to 
induction/abduction.  
P2b. It is not clear how the reliability of induction/abduction can be explained. 
C1: Liberalised modal empiricism fails to meet the IC for modality. 
Modal empiricists criticize modal rationalists for not meeting the IC for modality. But if the 
IC as it applies to induction/abduction has not been met either, that puts empiricists in a poor 
place to criticise rationalists for failing in this particular regard. 
There might be an additional problem, even assuming for the sake of argument that 
there is enough of a (although perhaps partial or sketch-like) explanation of the ampliative 
principle’s reliability. The hope is, I take it, for liberalised modal empiricism to free-ride on 
whatever that explanation turns out to be. But there is a general obstacle for such free-riding 
attempts. Again, we may consider the analogy with simplicity. It is sometimes said that since 
 
20 Abduction, when conceived of as a form of inference to the best explanation (in line with Biggs’ paper) involves 
assessing which out of several candidates perform best in relation to a number of abductive principles like simplicity, 
parsimony, comprehensiveness, etc. Meeting the IC given abductive modal empiricism thus involves addressing why 
a combination of these principles reliably indicates modal truth. (For a fuller discussion of Biggs’ abductive modal 
epistemology, see my 2019a, section 3.2.2.) 
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simplicity is demonstrably truth-indicative in the context of science, we may assume that it is 
truth-indicative in the context of philosophy too. But as Huemer points out: 
Presumably there is some reason why simplicity is truth-indicative (…). In the 
absence of (…) identification [of this reason], the assumption that this reason 
applies equally well to philosophy as science is something of a leap of faith (2009, 
p. 229). 
Analogously, presumably there is some explanation of why e.g. induction or abduction leads 
us to mainly true beliefs in certain contexts. But unless we see that explanation, it is hard to 
say whether it will also apply in the context of the relevant modal beliefs. This is easiest to 
see with abduction, I think. Say that there is a reason why applying a combination of 
theoretical virtues reliably indicates truth in non-modal contexts, and so this practice justifies 
non-modal belief. The point of IC is that a story of justification must make sense in light of 
the story of the facts. But remember that a prominent reason for considering the IC to be 
especially difficult for a domain like modality has to do with the nature modal facts are taken 
to have, and many have clearly thought that modal facts are not like non-modal facts in 
various epistemically relevant aspects. So whether the explanation will carry over to the 
modal context depends both on the explanation, and on the nature of the modal facts. Hence 
to assess the success of a particular free-riding attempt, we will need to hear more about the 
modal metaphysics. This leads on to the problem with liberalised modal empiricism to be 
addressed in the next section, which is simply that they say too little about that. 
In sum, a deferral strategy is a way to meet the IC for modality only if the 
corresponding challenge is met for the domain to which it is deferred. Liberalised empiricist 
epistemologies defer the challenge to both perception of actual property instantiation, and 
ampliative principles like induction and abduction. While the IC can presumably be met for 
perception of actual properties of ordinary objects, it is not clear that the IC can be met for 
these ampliative modes of reasoning. Hence, liberalised modal empiricism fails NO MERE 
DEFERRAL. Until further work has been done, empiricists will be no better off than the 
rationalists who, according to empiricist criticism, fall prey to a revenge of the IC – often as 
result of their deferral strategy (e.g. reliance on unelucidated knowledge of essence, for which 
the IC has not been met). 
 
5. Making modal metaphysics matter 
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I suggest that there is also the following gap in the empiricists’ integrative story: they have 
neglected to hook the modal facts up to the picture they are painting, and so fails to heed 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS as it appears for deferral strategies. I said in section 3 that modal 
metaphysics still matters for the integration of deferral modal epistemologies in the sense that 
the relevant non-modal facts must presumably have something to do with the modal facts, if 
we are to explain how one can draw justified modal conclusions on the basis of knowing 
about some non-modal facts. No one would, I assume, suggest that Lowe wouldn’t need to 
spell out the relation he envisions between modal facts and essentialist facts as part of his 
epistemology of modality. This does not mean that it is mandatory for an essence-based 
modal epistemology to endorse that essentialist facts are metaphysically prior to modal facts 
(although this is how Lowe chooses to cash the relationship out). But the proponent of such a 
modal epistemology owes us some account of the relation between modal and essentialist 
truth. It is the relevant metaphysics of modality which props up the claim that we can reason 
from essentialist knowledge to modal knowledge – if essentialist truths had nothing to do with 
modal truths, that suggestion would appear unsupported.  
The reminder appears unnecessary in the case of essentialist knowledge – perhaps 
because it strikes us as suspect in a way which empirical knowledge does not, so the demand 
for an elucidation comes naturally to us there. But it is important to note that if we hold modal 
epistemologies to this standard, it also applies to liberalised modal empiricism. Just as we 
want to know in virtue of what essentialist knowledge can epistemically support modal 
beliefs, we should ask in virtue of what non-modal knowledge of actual property instantiation 
can epistemically support modal beliefs. To just say that induction can take us from one to the 
other is as unsatisfying as saying that we can reason from one to the other in the case of 
essentialist knowledge and modal knowledge, unless we are informed about some underlying 
relation between the two kinds of facts. We might intuitively feel as if we know what is going 
on, as soon as the context is inference from ordinary, hum-drum non-modal beliefs, and 
perhaps we are epistemically blameless in making these inferences, but the IC is not about 
that, just as it is not about demonstrating reliability. It is about being able to explain the 
promise of epistemic success that the modal epistemologist claims for her preferred method. 
But liberalised modal empiricists are typically silent on what they take to be the nature 
of modal facts. Either they say nothing about modal metaphysics at all (e.g. Leon, 2017; 
Roca-Royes, 2017), or they make an unspecific commitment to modal fact as mind-
independent and “unobservable”, but nothing more (e.g. Biggs, 2011). In particular, nothing is 
said about how modal facts relate to the non-modal facts that allegedly provide us with modal 
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knowledge. Until they do say something about this, it is very difficult to evaluate whether the 
IC, assuming modal realism, can be met by liberalised modal empiricism.  
I am not suggesting that empiricists could not amend this by elaborating on the 
underlying metaphysical story, or that empiricists would need to appeal to some particularly 
implausible or problematic kind of modal metaphysics.21 And as it turns out, elaboration on 
the relevant metaphysics will also be involved in meeting NO MERE DEFERRAL: whatever the 
explanation of the truth-conduciveness of induction/abduction is, we will need to have an idea 
of the metaphysics of modality in order to deflect the worry about the free-riding strategy, as 
noted above. Hence, the empiricist could potentially kill two birds with one stone here – 
providing the modal metaphysics is key to meeting both constraints. But the point is that until 
we have the story, it cannot be properly evaluated, and until then we cannot say that modal 
empiricism is in a better position with respect to integration than deferralist competitors that 
base modal knowledge on rationalist knowledge of some kind or other – especially insofar as 
the connection between modal facts and facts in the deferred-to domain arguably has been 
elucidated on rationalist accounts like Peacocke’s and Lowe’s. Building on the argument 
stated in the previous section, we can summarise the situation as follows22: 
P1. In order to meet the IC for modality, NO MERE DEFERRAL and METAPHYSICS MATTERS 
must be respected. 
P2. Liberalised modal empiricism fails NO MERE DEFERRAL (from P2a, P2b). 
P2a. Liberalised modal empiricism defers to perceptual knowledge and to 
induction/abduction.  
P2b. It is not clear how the IC for induction/ abduction can be met.  
P3. Liberalised modal empiricism fails to respect METAPHYSICS MATTERS (from P3a). 
P3a. The connection between modal and non-modal facts has not been elucidated. 
C1: Liberalised modal empiricism fails to meet the IC for modality 
P4. Rationalist modal epistemologies (e.g. Lowe’s essence-based and Peacocke’s principles 
of possibility) fail to respect NO MERE DEFERRAL (from P4a). 
P4a. Rationalist modal epistemologies rely on or defer to methods for which it is 
not clear how the IC can be met. 
P5. Rationalist modal epistemologies do respect METAPHYSICS MATTERS (from P5a). 
 
21 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore what modal metaphysics would be suitable. One interesting possibility 
might be to investigate how Vetter’s (2015) account of modal truth as grounded in dispositions of individual objects 
fares in combination with some form of liberalised modal empiricism, as an anonymous reviewer pointed out to me. 
22 Of course, I have not done anything to defend P4a in this paper, and as previously noted friends of essence-based 
accounts may well disagree. I am granting this point to empiricists for the sake of argument. 
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P5a. The connection between essentialist/constitutive facts and modal facts is clear. 
C2: Rationalist modal epistemologies fail to meet the IC for modality 
The master conclusion of this argument, with C1 and C2 taken together, is that both kinds of 
theory fail to meet the IC. Thus, at best, these rationalists and liberalised empiricists are 
equally bad off. Notably however, liberalised empiricism seems potentially worse off than 
prominent rationalist alternatives, in the sense that it respects neither constraint, whereas these 
rationalists arguably respect METAPHYSICS MATTERS.  
 
5. Conclusions  
I have argued that liberalised modal empiricism is not, contrary to what is often assumed, 
obviously better off with respect to the IC for modality than certain traditional, rationalist 
modal epistemologies. In fact, it may be worse off, even granting empiricists their standard 
integration critique against rationalist modal epistemology. I argued that NO MERE DEFERRAL 
and METAPHYSICS MATTERS are both reasonable constraints on any attempt to meet the IC, by 
the empiricists’ own lights. Liberalised modal empiricism fails to respect NO MERE DEFERRAL 
because it is not clear how the truth-conduciveness of the ampliative principles doing all the 
work is to be explained. Hence, there is a potential “revenge” of the IC, akin to that which 
faces (some prominent versions of) modal rationalism, according to empiricist critics. 
Liberalised modal empiricism also fails to respect METAPHYSICS MATTERS as it appears for 
deferral strategies, because too little has been said about the relevant form of modal realism 
that is assumed on the metaphysics-side of things, and in particular about how modal facts 
relate to the non-modal facts that supposedly inform us about modal matters (with the help of 
ampliative principles). Prominent rationalist alternatives, on the other hand, appear to respect 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS. Until more work has been done by the empiricist in response to these 
two issues, it cannot reasonably be assumed that empiricism is more promising with respect to 
the IC. 
Of course, the empiricist could instead reject the requirement that a modal epistemology 
should be able to meet the IC. But then she cannot heap integration-related criticism on her 
rationalist rivals, and since the IC is lurking behind much traditional critique of rationalist 
modal epistemology, this may have unpalatable dialectical consequences. Rejecting the 
explanatory IC in favour of weak compatibility also undermines the critique against 
rationalists, and so is not in the empiricists’ interest. The best option for modal empiricists 
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seems to be to take the IC for modality seriously, and get cracking on the positive story 
available given her own view, assuming some more particular form of modal realism.23 
Finally, as I noted early on, the IC is not unique to modality but arises for most areas of 
philosophical interest, although it is not always equally challenging to achieve integration. 
Whether it is hard or easy, again, depends on what kind of metaphysics and what kind of 
epistemology are taken to be in the right ballpark for that area. Can we learn anything about 
the IC for other areas, from what I have argued here? Yes, certainly: METAPHYSICS MATTERS 
and NO MERE DEFERRAL applies for the IC in all areas, and so they can be used to assess the 
integrative success of accounts – empiricist and otherwise – in areas outside of modality. 
However, one aspect of the point I am making here is that how the IC is to be met for a given 
area, and whether empiricist epistemologies are promising alternatives for that area when it 
comes to integration, depends very much on what the correct metaphysics of that domain is 
taken to be.24 In other words, while we can certainly look for inspiration in other seemingly 
similar domains when we consider possible ways to explain reliability in the sense relevant 
here, meeting the IC in a domain always involves carefully considering the particular 
candidate metaphysics and epistemologies available for that particular domain. 
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